In the process of interpreting this Amendment to make applicable against state government the full religion clause of the First Amendment, itself applicable only against Congress,"0 the Court has rejected a number of arguments still troublesome to the historically minded. Successively, the Court considered and disposed of the following contentions: (1) the due process clause, as part of the Fourteenth Amendment, was ratified in 1868 merely to extend additional constitutional protection to Negroes beyond what the Reconstruction Congress believed had already been accomplished in the Thirteenth Amendment, and had no purpose to limit government power outside the race zone; (2) the clause, as it says, is concerned only with the integrity of the process or means by which decisions affecting life, liberty, or property are made, i.e., that those means conform with due process, and it has nothing to do with the substance of a legislative decision arrived at by an appropriate and reasonable procedure; (3) assuming there is a substantive due process aspect to the clause, however, an interest in religion is not within the kind of "liberty" contemplated; i.e., there was no incorporation of the First Amendment's religion clause into the due process clause; (4) assuming there was some incorporation, still, since the due process clause speaks of "liberty," only that part of the First Amendment protecting religious liberty is made applicable to states, and the establishment clause is not applicable. Consequently, if a state law does not impair anyone's liberty to worship as he pleases; there can be no complaint if it merely promotes religion or subsidizes religious interests, even though such practices might constitute an establishment of religion under the First Amendment."
867
It is familiar learning that all of these arguments have been rejected, and that the First Amendment is regarded as fully and equally applicable against the states. Similarly, the Court has rejected the argument that the establishment clause was intended only to require that government be neutral among religions, rather than detached from religion itself, i.e., that laws of benefit to religion are constitutional when the benefit is extended on a nonsectarian or nonpreferential basis sufficient to guard against establishing any one church as the state religion. The rejection of this and the preceding arguments has now become so consistent and so emphatic that there is no practical benefit in re-evaluating them once again. Since 1947, the Court has heard eleven cases involving challenges to state laws where the challenges were based on the establishment clause of the First Amendment.12 In nearly every case, the arguments summarized above were elaborately presented in behalf of the state. While only five of the eleven cases actually went against the state in terms of the decision, in no case did the Court sustain a law on the basis of any of the above arguments. That these arguments are no longer presentable in the Court is clear from the following abrupt statements from the majority opinion in this year's school prayer cases: First, this Court has decisively settled that the First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" has been made wholly applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Second, this Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the establishment clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over another. 13 What the Court has done, instead, is to treat the two aspects of the religion clause as stating a single principle applicable to federal and state government. One aspect is the admonition that government may not act to burden the free exercise of religion. The other is that government may not act to benefit religion. The free exercise and establishment subclauses, taken together, are thus designed to commit government to a studied neutrality with respect to religion while government attempts to fulfill its numerous delegated, implied, and reserved secular responsibilities. children, and since the parochial schools' curricula satisfied New Jersey's secular state standards of education, it was reasonable for a township to be as concerned with their general welfare as with the welfare of other school children, and to treat them equally. The analogy was drawn to other municipal services: city policemen and firemen protect churches and their parishoners just as they protect department stores and their customers. Since these are protected not because they are religious, but solely because, their religion aside, they are otherwise simply members of a larger class whose welfare and protection is the proper concern of government, no violation of the establishment clause is involved. In terms of the standard offered above, the decision appears defensible in these terms: It is a proper function of government to encourage education and to promote safety in the transportation of children. Recognizing that government cannot operate in a vacuum, i.e., with literally no effect on matters which incidentally assist or injure religious interests, those secular purposes may be fulfilled by public reimbursement of the costs of school transportation without violating the establishment clause.
In McCollum v. Board of Education,9 a school board permitted various churches to conduct religious classes on school property and during the regular school day. Children not choosing to attend such a class were obliged to remain on campus, in a study hall. Noting that the arrangement benefited religion by providing free facilities for religious indoctrination, and noting too that the program involved a measure of coercion on impressionable youngsters, the Court was obliged to determine whether these benefits, like those in Everson, were merely incidental to some secular purpose, or at least were no more than an unavoidable consequence of the fulfillment of some purpose otherwise within the power of government to promote. The released-time courses were not, however, courses about religion which might be defended simply as constituting part of a general liberal education.20 Since there was no primary and independent secular purpose being The four Sunday Closing Law Cases22 sus-21 Analytically, the three school prayer cases are scarcely more difficult on the merits than McCollum. These cases severally involved a prayer composed by state officials and required to be recited by school children other than those excused on written request of their parents, and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer or the reading of sections from the Bible or Jewish scriptures, without comment, at the beginning of each school day. Here, too, participation was required by students not excused on written request of their parents, and the religious exercise was itself required by state law or school board regulation. While markedly less financial aid was involved in these programs than in McCollum, since the time taken each day for prayers or bible reading consumed a bare moment or two, the arrangement still involved substantial aid to religion. Students doubtless felt some compulsion to participate, and the prestige of school authorities employed in a repetitious ritual and the authoritarian atmosphere of the schoolroom would influence many youngsters. The inculcation of religion as distinguished from teaching about religion in courses on literature or history, moreover, is clearly not among the "proper functions" of government. See discussion, notes 17-20, supra. Consequently, it is easy to appreciate the decision of the Court holding these practices invalid under the test described above, even assuming the amount of aid to religion was relatively slight; such aid was not incidental to any primary or independent secular purpose which would save the scheme. (The school board alleged, however, that the religious practices did serve independent secular purposes. This matter is considered infra, text, at n. tained state laws prohibiting commercial activity on Sunday, even where the law made no exception for Sabbatarians while exempting an odd collection of sales transactions relating to presumed emergency needs, recreation or works of charity. As in Everson, the Court did not deny that these laws conferred a benefit on religion by placing the power of government behind the strictly religious teaching of some Christian sects opposed to labor on the Lord's Day. Moreover, it conceded as well that in some cases at least, the impetus for such laws had been frankly religious in character, i.e., religious organizations had lobbied successfully for such statutes. Seemingly, such laws should be unconstitutional, as they violate the test and offend the political objective of the establishment clause to keep government from becoming the captive of organized religion.
Nevertheless, the statutes were upheld in all four cases. As in Everson, the result turned on a finding that the supposed benefit to religion which flowed from these laws was merely incidental to a primary and independent secular objective, properly within the police power of the state. These objectives were essentially like those furthered by a variety of laws protecting the health and general welfare of working people, e.g., minimum age and wage laws, maximum hours laws, collective bargaining laws, etc. It was equally consistent with the general welfare to set aside one day in seven, to assure each person an opportunity for psychological and physical recuperation, to allow families and friends to come together, and generally to insulate the community from the hectic drudgery and raucous noise of the work week. The fact that the particular day set aside by law, Sunday, coincided with the religious preference of dominant organizations, was not enough to convert the law into an establishment of religion: 
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cause the religious classes were held off campus and no school personnel were involved; (2) less governmental sanction was placed behind the religious views presented in the off-campus classes, since the classes were not conducted under school auspices and the participating children would not regard the religious instructor with the same submissiveness as they might their teacher within the regular classroom. Still, some evidence indicated that because non-participating students were required to remain in their classrooms, government did aid religion by subtly coercing student participation. But even more critical, the Zorach arrangement showed no more of a substantial, or primary and independent secular purpose being served by the released-time program than in McCollum itself. Consequently, this case is often regarded as a departure from the standard, and as an aberration not likely to be followed today.25 25 It is arguable, however, that Zorach is defensible according to the standard, when one recalls that the unitary precept of the First Amendment is that government should act neither to benefit nor to burden religion. If one focusses not exclusively on the released-time program, but on the net effect of government having embarked on a compulsory education program, Zorach becomes more understandable in these terms: by enacting laws to require children to attend schools during most of the day, the state initially made it more difficult than before for those students to attend religious classes during those same days. By thereafter scheduling its own secular classes to accommodate those students who wished to attend religious classes off campus, the state merely acted to redress the balance, i.e., it restored to the students an opportunity to exercise the religious freedom which they enjoyed before regular school attendance was required.
To a large extent, however, this same argument was also involved in the school prayer cases where a Zorach rationale was rejected by a majority of eight members of the Court. The lone dissenting opinion, by Mr. Justice Stewart, argued that the compulsory school attendance law initially operated to make it more difficult for children to engage in the free exercise of religion, i.e., that it tended to abridge religious activities: "[A] compulsory state educational system so structures a child's life that if religious exercises are held to be an impermissible activity in schools, religion is placed at an artificial and state-created disadvantage. Viewed in this light, permission of such exercises for those who want them is necessary if the schools are truly to be neutral in the matter of With the possible exception of Zorach, however, all of the establishment cases are seemingly consistent with the standard of neutrality which we have derived from the Court's several opinions. Even so, there is widespread disagreement within the Court and among the commentators as to the constitutionality of a vast number of existing and proposed churchreligion." School District v. Schempp, above, note 1, at p. 313.
Nevertheless, more than "neutrality" was involved in the prayer cases. In the following respects, the program as it was administered did more than merely restore the opportunity children might have had to exercise religious prerogatives in the absence of any compulsory school attendance: (a) The prayer in Engel was obviously not of each student's or each family's private choosing, but was composed by state officials and was sectarian in character; it read as follows: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country." The Court has defined religion broadly, to include some nontheistic and many relatively small sects. See text at n. 32, infra. In this view, the Engel prayer becomes sectarian, e.g., the invocation of God is incompatible with nontheistic sects, an oral prayer is disliked by Quakers, the presumed value of prayer itself, describing the relationship between man and God as one of supplication and paternal response, and the use of a prayer to favor a particular country-all of these are variously offensive to a number of religions. Nevertheless, the arrangement even in Zorach actually did more than restore opportunities for religious endeavors which young people would theoretically have had in the absence of compulsory school attendance laws, and for this reason, the case is of doubtful authority. If the purpose of the released time program was merely to allow students to follow their own, or their family's inclination to have them attend religious classes during the week at some church, that purpose would be adequately served by having the school release all students at certain specified times, leaving to each student and his parents the decision as to how that released time should be spent. In Zorach, however, those students not attending religious classes were obliged to remain in their regular classrooms, and careful records of released students were maintained to make certain that they did attend the religious classes. The net effect of the program was consequently to ply a subtle coercion in favor of attendance at the religious classes, and not merely to provide students with the same freedom of choice they would have enjoyed had they all simply been dismissed from school on their own, or their family's recognizance. Intellectually, the Chief Justice doubtless overstated the case in asserting that such legislation is adopted "wholly apart from any religious considerations," for some more or less privately held religious consideration probably underlies the value judgments held by the great majority of electors and legislators who created the law.35 Especially was this so in the very Sunday Closing Law Cases in which this statement appeared. Nevertheless, the practical effect of the Chief Justice's proffered distinction is probably the best compromise we can expect; it guards against militant church pressures while permitting laws which do not appear to be the particular result of such institutional pressure. This is not to assert, however, that laws which have some hypothetical value beyond serving the self-aggrandizing institutional interests of one or more churches are automatically valid under the Establishment Clause, as the discussion in the following sections may indicate. It is only to assert that there is a clearer offense to the political objectives of the Clause when a given law results from, or tempts, institutional pressure from organized religion and does not merely coincide with matters of religious concern.
Religion may be a more inclusive thing, however, when the issue is whether freedom to exercise religion has been abridged rather than whether religion has been established. In this connection, the Court's suggestion that "religion" is not merely co-extensive with the better established and more highly organized sects, may be taken more seriously. For while the primary (although not exclusive) concern of the Establishment Clause is to resist the importunities of distinctly institutional religious pressures, the concern of the abridgment clause is to protect individual prerogatives of conscience,36 and not merely to protect the freedom of institutionalized religion or conscience. Saluting the flag, for instance, may not involve either marked assistance or harm to the vast majority of people or to a church as such, but the offense it gives to some who conscientiously oppose such a practice has been held sufficient that the flag salute cannot be compelled by law.37 Even so, at some point individual assertions of conscience, absolutely sheltered by the abridgment clause, could equally frustrate any significant governmental activity just as a broad definition of religion would bar other 
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state action because it tended to establish religion. In the face of religious objections to medicine, for instance, laws requiring vaccination against contagious diseases, or fluoridated water systems which all must use, constitute a measure of abridgment. In these matters, the Court may be expected to hold that where the governmental activity is broadly supported by democratically determined objectives which are not anti-religious by design and which cannot so feasibly be carried on without applying to all persons, an incidental abridgment of some religious interests is constitutionally permissible.38 Where the public purpose can be substantially served without discommoding personal religious interests, however, the abridgment clause may operate to shelter even the unorthodoxies of small minorities or single, unorganized individuals. Because the abridgment clause is more designed to protect the individual as well as the church from the state, while the establishment clause is more concerned with insulating the civil process from manipulation by organized religion, we may reasonably expect the Court to define "religion" more broadly in the context of alleged abridgments.
Distinguishing Actual Purposes from Rationalized Purposes. Most of the laws reviewed by the Court under the Establishment Clause, and many still to be reviewed, produce a multiplicity of effects. Some of these effects are clearly secular, according to common understanding, and others are clearly religious. In Everson, as we have noted, one effect of the reimbursement plan was to encourage safe transportation and to reduce traffic hazards for children, something clearly within the competence of government to accomplish. At the same time, it was also true that another effect was to subsidize religious instruction, by relieving parents of the cost of transporting their children to parochial schools. In McGowan, as we have noted, one effect was to promote the general welfare by guaranteeing one day each week free from common labor. At the same time, the arrangement did throw the weight of government behind those religions that seek the observance of Sunday strictly for religious reasons. To a lesser extent, the prayer cases involved entwined secular and religious objectives; the use of prayers at the beginning of each school day was defended before the Court partly on the grounds that it served the follow- ing independent and salutary secular purposes: to foster harmony and tolerance among the pupils; to cause each individual pupil to constrain his overt acts and consequently to conform to accepted standards of behavior during his attendance at school; to enhance the authority of the teacher; and to inspire better discipline.39 Similarly, the pledge of allegiance arguably serves secular as well as religious purposes, e.g., to inculcate a spirit of nationality, loyalty, and patriotism in the young, or "merely to recognize the historical fact that our Nation was believed to have been founded 'under God.' "40 Federal aid proposals, inclusive of parochial schools, may be defended as promoting education to better the economy, education and defense of the country, or criticized as subsidizing the inculcation of religion in parochial schools.4' Since the operation of these laws does produce multiple effects, it is obvious that the constitutionality of a particular scheme may well depend upon the judicial characterization as to which of these is the predominant effect. 
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Jackson described the township's reimbursement plan as though it had been adopted solely as a result of importunities by Catholics to obtain financial assistance:
If we are to decide this case on the facts before us, our question is simply this: Is it constitutional to tax this complainant to pay the cost of carrying pupils to Church schools of one specified denomination?44
Neither of these descriptions is wholly correct or incorrect. Both, however, may be somewhat disingenuous, and surely it cannot be determined merely by studying the face of the ordinance which effect was in fact the primary one as intended by the council which adopted it. If the constitutional requirement is that a law affecting religion cannot stand unless it is supported by a primary and independent secular objective, it would seem imperative in situations such as this for the Court to attempt to discover which among several objectives actually provided the primary incentive for the law. If in fact the ordinance in Everson was merely the result of Catholic pressure for aid, for instance, the law would appear to be a product of the very kind of church-state collaboration which the First Amendment meant to discourage even if such collaboration is disguised as a "safety" law.
It is sometimes exceedingly difficult for courts to determine legislative purpose, especially in connection with state statutes enacted by legislatures which do not maintain a journal of debate or a record of committee hearings. The difficulty of the task should not be exaggerated, however, and ought not be confused with a judicial search of legislative motives. The motives of legislators more commonly concern their personal reasons for acting, e.g., sympathy or hostility to religion, desires to be reelected, etc., whereas their purpose in acting more substantially relates to the immediate objective to be accomplished by the law which is enacted.45
It is to be hoped that the Court will not belittle the Establishment Clause by rationalizing primary secular purposes from the face of laws they are called on to review, and by neglecting the essential inquiry into legislative facts. 
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to reverse the conviction. In Justice Black's view, it was not enough that the questions could serve a proper governmental objective, if in fact it (a) also served unconstitutional objectives and (b) the legislature's primary purpose was to accomplish the latter. The same thing can be said in reviewing legislation which accomplishes a multiplicity of secular and religious objectives.
There is reason to anticipate that the Court will make a more assiduous inquiry into legislative purpose in future cases, at least where state laws are involved."1 In a number of the race cases, state laws which ostensibly served legitimate legislative objectives have been struck down when it became clear that they also served illegimate objectives which actually inspired the legislation.52 Similarly, in the most recent school prayer cases, Mr. Justice Brennan acknowledged that such prayers may have some secular effects wholly within the power of the state to promote, but he found that these, on closer examination, were not independent effects nor in fact the primary purtary association, it may become so when the investigation is of a department of government.
Additionally, it remains true that some purpose other than exposure nearly always can be rationalized, and the dictum in Watkins has not yet become a holding if only for this reason: "The truth of the matter is that the balancing test, at least as applied to date, means that the Committee may engage in any inquiry a majority of this Court happens to think could possibly be for a legitimate purpose whether that 'purpose' be the true reason for the inquiry or not. And under the tests of legitimacy that are used in this area, any first-year law school student worth his salt could construct a rationalization to justify almost any question put to any witness at any time. It may be thought ironical that such an analysis may hold one law constitutional and another unconstitutional, when both operate in identical fashions in two different communities. Nevertheless, if one of the purposes of the Establishment Clause is to discourage attempts by organized religion to manipulate the civil process, certainly it is necessary and appropriate for the Court to determine whether such attempts accounted for the laws being reviewed. Any other approach to the subject invites religious establishment in cellophane packages, and would frequently make it empirically impossible to determine whether there was any primary secular objective being served by the law.
Alternative Means of Fulfilling Governmental Functions Without Pronounced Effects on Religion. To illustrate the importance of this consideration, it is useful to consider the controversy over aid to education. At the outset, it is certainly clear that state governments fulfill a proper role by encouraging education through the enactment of attendance laws, the construction and operation of schools and universities, and by providing a host of auxiliary services such as transportation, books, counselling offices, recreation facilities, etc., as well as the basic paraphernalia of a school itself. Similarly, it is also virtually beyond question today that the federal government may assist and encourage these undertakings as it has in the historic grants of public lands, in providing National Defense, Fulbright, National Institute of Health and other scholarships, in providing research contracts which enable universities to add to their facilities, staff, and student bodies, etc. Virtually nothing in the current debate concerning aid to education Granted that federal assistance to education would serve a proper governmental function, it might appear that the inclusion of parochial schools and colleges in such a program would not raise any serious constitutional issue either. For just as in Everson or the Sunday Closing Law Cases, any benefit which religious institutions might derive from such a program could be defended as merely incidental to a primary and independent secular purpose, and so long as the legislative record disclosed that Congress's paramount interest was really to foster education, rather than primarily to promote religion, the arrangement would appear to be valid.
The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that the requirement of church-state separation is not to be regarded so narrowly. It is not enough that a proper purpose was sincerely intended to be fulfilled by government, if that purpose could have been substantially fulfilled by other means which involve less effect on religion. The precept of the First Amendment is that government should attempt to promote the general welfare with the least effect on religion, and not merely that it should promote that welfare with but incidental, albeit substantial, effect on religion. Thus, in McGowan v. Maryland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said:
If the value to society of achieving the object of a particular regulation is demonstrably outweighed by the impediment to which the regulation subjects those whose religious practices are curtailed by it, or if the object sought by the regulation could with equal effect be achieved by alternative means which do not substantially impede those religious practices, the regulation cannot be sustained.55
In the most recent school prayer cases, Mr. Justice Brennan made a similar observation:
But the teaching of both Torcaso and the Sunday Law Cases is that government may not employ religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suffice. be resolved simply by asserting that "education" is the proper concern of government, and that since parochial schools also meet the secular standards of states or accrediting associations, their inclusion would be constitutional. What the issue requires is a more careful examination of: (a) the particular form of aid which may be provided, to determine whether its use is substantially confined to secular purposes; and (b) the feasibility of providing that aid through alternative means which involve less of a subsidy to religious institutions. Note, for instance, how differently the constitutional question might be answered depending upon which of the following types of federal aid proposals were adopted:
1. Congress appropriates one billion dollars for "education", to be disbursed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to each college which may receive a total grant equivalent to $500 for each full time student. The money thus disbursed may be used according to each college's own determinations. 2. Congress appropriates one billion dollars for "education," to be disbursed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, upon the application of colleges demonstrating a need and specific plans for the construction of laboratories to be used exclusively for teaching and research in chemistry, physics, or engineering.
In the first case, a qualifying parochial college would be free to employ the funds thus granted to construct a chapel, to purchase additional copies of the Bible, in the teaching or subsidizing of aspiring ministers and priests, etc. In the second case, the funds are restricted so that the benefits to religion are markedly reduced. Such benefits are still conspicuous, however, in that the parochial college becomes more attractive to applicants by enjoying an enhanced physical plant, and private fundsfrom which the college otherwise derives its support-may now be released for wholly religious uses on campus. While the first case is almost clearly an instance of unconstitutional aid in view of the dicta of the Court, the second case appears arguable. A strict separatist might well argue that because parochial colleges account for only a small percentage of higher education, it is feasible for government to encourage education in the physical sciences in a substantial fashion by limiting its aid to public and nonparochial private colleges alone; since this is a feasible alternative means of carrying forward the primary secular objective without the same benefit to religion, the
